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Abstract
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol requires all im-
plementations to support public key authentication
method (“publickey”) for authentication purposes
[2]. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) appli-
cations which provide a SSH client over the web
browser need to support “publickey”. However, re-
strictions in HTTP, such as Same Origin Policy,
make it difficult to perform such authentications.
In this document, a system to perform “publickey”
authentication over HTTP is provided. It is en-
sured that no compromise is made that would pose
a security risk to SSH protocol.
1 Introduction
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol is a protocol for
secure remote login to servers. It computes a shared
key through key exchange mechanisms, such as
Diffie-Hellman key exchange [3], and establishes a
secure channel for communication to servers. Users
are authenticated through the secure channel using
one of the accepted authentication methods. Com-
monly used authentication methods include “pass-
word” and “publickey”. As the name suggests, in
case of “password” method, the user is simply re-
quired to provide his/her password for authenti-
cation. However, “publickey” method uses pub-
lic/private key pairs for authentication.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an
application-level protocol for data transfer across
the internet. It is generic, stateless and can be used
for purposes beyond hypertext.
2 Authentication “publickey”
In “publickey” authentication method, User creates
a public/private key pair and adds the public key
on the server. For successful authentication, the
SSH protocol requires the message [2], shown be-
low, to be signed by the private key of the user.
And, the signed message should be verified by the
server using the public key added by the user. On
successful verification, authentication is successful
and the user is permitted to login.
string session identifier
byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
string user name
string service name
string "publickey"
boolean TRUE
string public key algorithm name
string public key blob
The session identifier, shown above, is a secret
and is specific to that SSH session.
It is common for private keys to be kept in an
encrypted format for security reasons. However,
this creates the hassle of decrypting the private key
for authentication every single time. Authentica-
tion agents, such as ssh-agent [4], handle this by
managing the decrypted private keys and signing
messages for SSH clients on demand.
3 Authentication agents
ssh-agent implements OpenSSH agent protocol [4]
to manage private keys and to sign messages.
Clients connect to the agent, typically, over an
UNIX domain socket to send requests and receive
responses. UNIX domain socket is a special file in
the file system. To restrict access, the special file
has read/write permissions only for the user.
If we could implement an authentication agent,
similar to ssh-agent, that would manage private
keys but accept signing requests over HTTP. That
would be an agent which can enable SSH “pub-
lickey” authentications through HTTP clients.
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4 SSH Web Agent
Here, we are defining a new authentication agent,
ssh-webagent, which responds to authentication re-
quests over HTTP. It accepts requests only from
user and only on localhost. And, due to same ori-
gin policy, HTTP clients will not accept content
from localhost unless Cross Origin Resource Shar-
ing (CORS) [5] is enabled. It is also recommended
that ssh-webagent accept HTTP requests over TLS
[7] to avoid Mixed Content [6].
4.1 Trusted Servers
On receiving an authentication request, it is impor-
tant to identify the source of the request. A HTTP
client could connect to ssh-webagent out of any web
page, and without verification, a serious security
risk exists. To verify the source, a combination of
HTTP Referer header and public key of the server
should be used. While the Referer header can be
used to identify the public key of the server, the ac-
tual verification is successful only if the signature
provided by the server is valid.
Server’s public key and HTTP Referer changes
for each web application. It is therefore recom-
mended that a trusted servers file is used to hold
the public key of trusted servers along with the ex-
pected values of HTTP Referer header. The trusted
servers file should be kept safe to avoid unautho-
rized modifications. A sample format for trusted
servers file has been provided in Appendix A.
4.2 Identifiers
HTTP is stateless and each request is independent
of the other. Each HTTP request has a correspond-
ing response but the order of HTTP requests and
state, if any, shall be managed by the application.
In case of authentication over a TCP connec-
tion, a session is established and can be uniquely
identified by 5-tuple1. However, HTTP provides
no session and hence ssh-webagent has to establish
a logical session to the trusted server and assign a
unique identifier. ssh-webagent can interact with
multiple trusted servers at the same time. And,
ssh-webagent shall choose the unique identifier.
The state of the authentication process shall be
maintained in association with the identifier. How-
ever, it should be noted that, a failure in the au-
thentication process may not always be known to
ssh-webagent. So, it is essential to maintain a rea-
sonably short timeout for the authentication pro-
cess, beyond which the identifier and its associated
state is destroyed.
1source IP address, source port, destination IP address,
destination port, transport protocol
4.3 Local User and Local Host
Since ssh-webagent accepts authentication request
on localhost, it shall be ensured that the request is
from the same user who runs ssh-webagent. Support
for this feature varies across operating systems and
Appendix C shows how the owner of a TCP con-
nection can be identified on systems running Linux
kernel.
When ssh-webagent binds to a specific port on
localhost, no other user will be able to use the same
port. So, applications which intend to support mul-
tiple local users, can choose multiple ports and send
authentication request to all of them. A standard
has been proposed to use a specific local IP address
and port for ssh-webagent in Appendix B.
4.4 Session
ssh-webagent shall establish a secure session with
the trusted server before processing authentication
requests. The session is initiated by a signed re-
quest from the trusted server with Diffie-Hellman
(DH)2 parameters. On successful verification, ssh-
webagent shall send a Diffie-Hellman response with
an encrypted identifier. The secret established
through Diffie-Hellman key exchange shall be used
in the encryption of the identifier. And, once the
trusted server successfully decrypts this identifier,
the session is established.
The authentication process following session cre-
ation, will use the identifier in both clear and en-
crypted data. ssh-webagent shall identify the ses-
sion using the clear text identifier. However, it shall
verify that the identifier in encrypted data matches
the one in clear text.
5 Proposed Protocol
In this section, we define a protocol over HTTP
that can be used for “publickey” authentication. It
involves both session creation and authentication
process. We start with the format of HTTP re-
quests and responses before discussing each of them
in detail.
5.1 HTTP Request/Response
The protocol uses base64 encoded messages
in both HTTP request and response. HTTP
request shall use method POST and content
type application/x-www-form-urlencoded,
while HTTP response shall use content type
text/plain. HTTP request in this format will
classify as simple cross-site request under CORS
specification [5].
2Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm[3]
2
P=[Message]&U=[User]&S=[Service]
As a POST request, the key P shall be used to pass
messages and, optionally, the keysU and S shall be
used to pass user and service names3 respectively.
[Message]
The response body simply contains the message
in response to the request and nothing more.
5.2 Message
Message is the basic unit of the protocol. A single
message is received in the HTTP request and a sin-
gle message is sent in the HTTP response. Message
uses a binary format and data types used, in repre-
sentation of the format, are as defined in RFC 4251
[1], Section 5 “Data Type Representations Used in
the SSH Protocols”.
string “SSHWebAgent”
byte version
byte type
string data
version shall indicate the version of the protocol
and shall be used to check compatability of ssh-
webagent and trusted server.
VERSION_1_1 0x11
type shall indicate the type of data the message
holds.
KEX_DH_REQUEST 0x02
KEX_DH_RESPONSE 0x03
PRIVATE 0x04
data holds request parameters and response values
in binary format. The format varies based on
type and, hence, are described in their respec-
tive sections.
5.3 Session
Session is initiated by a message from trusted server
containing key exchange parameters and its sig-
nature. The message will contain data of type
KEX_DH_REQUEST in the format described be-
low,
mpint p
mpint g
mpint e
string d
string k
string sign
p, g are Diffie-Hellman key exchange parameters
prime number and generator, respectively.
3user and service names are part of SSH message, See
Section 2
e is the computed value of trusted server in key
exchange
d is session data, if any, added by trusted server.
It shall be used by ssh-webagent without any
interpretation.
k, sign are the public key and signature, of the
trusted server, represented in their respective
formats as defined in RFC 4253 [3], Section 6.6
“Public Key Algorithms”.
5.3.1 Verification
On receiving the message, ssh-webagent uses the
trusted servers file and checks if the public key and
the HTTP Referer are trusted. On a successful
match, the message shall be checked for authen-
ticity through signature verification. The following
values are used in the specified order for signing
and verification,
mpint p
mpint g
mpint e
string method
string referer
string k
string d
method shall be the method used in HTTP re-
quest. As mentioned in Section 5.1, this shall
be POST.
referer shall be the value of Referer field in HTTP
request header.
5.3.2 Response
On successful verification of signature, ssh-webagent
shall send a message containing data of type
KEX_DH_RESPONSE in the format described
below,
mpint f
string E
f is the computed value of ssh-webagent in key ex-
change.
E is the encrypted message body of type NEW
viewable only by trusted server. message body
is described, in detail, in Section 5.4.
5.3.3 Secret
The secret S is computed by ssh-webagent through
Diffie-Hellman key exchange and it is used to com-
pute a shared secret, a secret key and an initializa-
tion vector.
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1. Shared Secret
shared secret is the computed hash of the fol-
lowing values using 256-bit Secure Hash Algo-
rithm (SHA-256) [8].
string method
string referer
mpint e
mpint f
mpint S
2. Secret Key
secret key shall be used as the key for symmet-
ric encryption. A SHA-256 hash of the follow-
ing values is the secret key.
mpint S
string shared secret
byte ’A’
string referer
3. Initialization Vector
Depending on the encryption algorithm, if
needed, the initialization vector can be ob-
tained by computing a SHA-256 hash of the
following values,
mpint S
string shared secret
byte ’B’
string referer
Once the trusted server receives the response mes-
sage. It computes its own values for the above and
decrypts the message body.
5.4 Message Body
The message body holds the cipher text for commu-
nication between ssh-webagent and trusted server.
It also includes the session identifier and the en-
cryption algorithm for decryption purposes. The
type of message body and its related contents are
encrypted and stored in cipher text.
5.4.1 format
The binary format of message body is shown below,
byte algorithm
string identifier
string ciphertext
algorithm used for encryption can be identified
using this field. Currently supported encryp-
tion algorithms and their respective values are
listed below,
AES_256_CBC 0x02
identifier is the session identifier.
ciphertext is the encrypted part of message body.
5.4.2 ciphertext and plaintext
The encrypted contents of ciphertext, namely the
plaintext , shall be in the format specified below,
byte[4] random
byte type
string identifier
. . . payload . . .
byte[n] padding
random shall be a 32-bit (4 bytes) cryptographi-
cally secure random number.
type indicates the message body type and it shall
be used to interpret the payload. The sup-
ported types are listed below,
NEW 0x02
AUTH_REQUEST 0x03
AUTH_RESPONSE 0x04
identifier is the session identifier and it shall be
the same as identifier defined in Section 5.4.1.
payload shall be zero or more bytes of message
content. The format of payload depends on
message body type and they are described in
detail in their respective sections.
padding shall be zero or more bytes of random
padding to meet the block size requirements of
encryption algorithms.
5.4.3 NEW
First message with a message body, in a session, is
always of type NEW. This message is sent by ssh-
webagent to trusted server. The format of plaintext
in message body of type NEW is shown below,
byte[4] random
byte type
string identifier
byte[n] padding
It should be noted that payload is empty and,
hence, is not shown in plaintext.
5.5 Authentication
The authentication process shall be initiated by
trusted server after establishing a session. The
messages used in the process are as defined in Sec-
tion 5.2 and shall contain message body as data and
shall use type PRIVATE.
5.5.1 Request
A request for “publickey” authentication is sent by
the trusted server in the form of a message con-
taining data of type PRIVATE and message body
of type AUTH_REQUEST.
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This request provides the secret SSH session
identifier4 required to generate SSH message for
signing and authentication. The format of the re-
quest message is shown below,
string “SSHWebAgent”
byte VERSION_1_1
byte PRIVATE
string message body
The format of message body is as follows,
byte algorithm
string identifier
string ciphertext
And, the format of plaintext that is encrypted to
form the ciphertext is,
byte[4] random
byte AUTH_REQUEST
string identifier
string SSH session identifier
byte[n] padding
SSH session identifier is as defined in RFC
4253 [3], Section 7.2, “Output from Key Exchange”
5.5.2 Response
In response to the request, ssh-webagent shall use
SSH session identifier, construct the SSH mes-
sage and sign it with one or more private keys of
the user. The resulting signatures are sent securely
in a response message to the trusted server for suc-
cessful authentication. The format of plaintext in
response message is as follows,
byte[4] random
byte AUTH_RESPONSE
string identifier
boolean status
string signatures
string options
byte[n] padding
status shall indicate whether the signing process
was successful or not. It shall be used to com-
municate failures to trusted server.
signatures contain one or more signatures of the
SSH message, along with the corresponding
public key and comments, if any. They are
formatted as follows,
uint32 n
string[n] item
And, each item shall use the format shown be-
low,
4session identifier as shown in SSH message, Section 2.
string publickey
string signature
string comment
string[n] shall represent multiple strings, with
the number of strings indicated by n. When
n is zero, string[n] shall be empty and, hence,
shall not be present.
options shall be used to pass information to the
trusted server in the form of key-value pairs.
It shall use the format as specified below,
uint32 n
byte es
string[n] option
And, each option shall hold a key and a value
as shown below,
string key
string value
The value shall be encrypted using an en-
cryption scheme es. The following encryption
schemes shall be supported,
PKCS1_RSAES_OAEP 0x02
PKCS1_RSAES_OAEP encryption scheme
shall use the public key of trusted server to
encrypt the value.
On receiving the response message, the trusted
server shall have all that it needs to perform “pub-
lickey” authentication in Secure Shell (SSH) proto-
col.
6 Performance
The authentication method ensures that the remote
login to server is secure. But, for the task at hand,
it is most likely a hindrence and sooner it is done,
the better. The primary contributing factors to
longer authentication time would be network la-
tency to trusted server. Data encryption, signing
and verification are reasonably quick on modern
processors and are negligible in comparison. The
latency to web agent will also be negligible since it
resides on localhost.
The protocol uses HTTP requests to receive
and send messages. Hence, session establishment
and authentication process will each require three
HTTP requests, when done synchronously. First
request shall be used to get the message (request)
from trusted server, second request shall be used to
pass the message (request) to web agent and receive
a message (response) and the final request shall
be used to pass the message (response) to trusted
server. With two requests to trusted server per ses-
sion establishment and authentication process. A
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total of four requests to trusted server remain the
primary contributing factors to performance.
HTTP request to trusted server will be over TLS.
Hence, apart from the usual TCP connection ne-
gotiation, a TLS session negotiation will also hap-
pen when a new connection is established. So, the
first request will take a significantly longer time,
in comparison to subsequent requests to trusted
server. The total time taken to complete four re-
quests can be significant and can be a hinderance.
To achieve better performance, it is recommended
that the network latency to trusted server remains
below 80ms.
7 Conclusion
Secure Shell protocol has been commonly used for
remote login to servers. It is the first step to man-
aging servers remotely. As the number of servers in-
crease, the problem of logging to multiple servers,
a time consuming task, become apparent. These
problems can be solved to an extent through appli-
cations which abstract out and automatically login
to servers. However, these applications may require
the private key of user for automatic login.
In a world with increasing use of virtualization,
more and more servers (or virtual servers) are pur-
chased from providers and managed remotely over
public internet using a web browser. In the ab-
sense of a method for secure remote login to these
servers, users are left to use traditional tools for lo-
gin or at worst, take a security risk and, give away
the private key to third-party applications.
Hence, solving the problem of secure remote lo-
gin (“publickey”) over the web, ie., HTTP, will open
doors for easier access to servers. And, bring back
private keys to the hands of the user. When com-
bined with a powerful server management applica-
tion, this can bring servers to general public, who,
without any technical knowledge, can avail inter-
net services through their servers in a decentralized
manner.
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A Trusted Servers File
The public key5 of trusted server and its accept-
able HTTP Referer prefixes are the contents of this
file. Each trusted server has an entry starting with
its public key on the first line, followed by one or
more acceptable prefixes of HTTP Referer values
per line. The entry for trusted server ends with a
line containing a single dot (.), followed by an entry
for next trusted server.
A sample trusted servers file in this format has
been shown below,
1 AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABA
QCrLJjgFEA7tLyydh5eS2DCglbS5/
767i5MaCoXoxZAphI/JqTD62nYJ6P
G0hYu8spE2kcTtNHl0mcsygFEaa8v
lFjxYL7dW/HuOfayQ+eHZq/xPtTlu
oSOW6yI9qKj1fnaxF9IHtdZVOkcSw
uEmlJfKjogf6Nbyn8M+biMK6Py5K4
sll0sN48WGYEz9Xe8CcZJdhCyw97f
hPELlXwCqvQjGqXpekSWTe4lpiQKv
1Zn6T7/E5VW0mvu419WkLlAU7qZ1x
fW5bfqggXnGnmOSawRGWzFaOEtsHJ
Wn4lc//OHiWYj0MRkLd7+VVsBEF+O
C2IAzJ4QyQtlecLkmu5Yfq/Z
2 https://webssh.example.com/ssh/
3 https://webssh.example.com:444/ssh/
4 https://webssh.example.com:445/ssh/
5 .
6 AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABA
QDPyjl9euMQ4Crj/0VyP69+ltELAM
4Wt0GyG8y3ENEtpa/Qv0XcJ1IZ8l3
lRRWt5+ame2LKQJwInK1xo3UqL+Jd
CA1OX9h1ap8wOWEm6ZHiehB0JNe7B
gIwPYl69qLpv48Xywtz28BahxZPSD
d7k5NxiH4HIUbau3tHlvsO2LOqj9p
QOPEDh+GdmMcgEv0ZQMY9B6uKJqI+
RdiDgWHNDUW+pFwRi2xzMFQqPCqC0
7ykKMI8G/Nl3Q7RQuDiRw9AhO/Brd
F1NEa3I4fyg09nPkBP351kBrLl17V
PgoVP24VZJkZSojEKnp4KkIhGLTfg
+5TqI6kx36blHZpx3g8txAQt
7 https://sshclient.example.com/
8 .
B Local IP, Port and Domain
SSH Web Agent binds to local loopback address
and accepts request on localhost. The IPv4 address
range assigned for local loopback is 127.0.0.0/8.6
Any address in this range can be used by web
agent for accepting requests. However, for easier
inter-operability, the IPv4 address, in this range,
127.82.11.29 and port number 8211 is suggested
for use.
5Public key should be in a format as defined in RFC 4253
[3], Section 6.6 “Public Key Algorithms”
6RFC 6890, “Special-Purpose IP Address Registries”
HTTP/TLS protocol requires web agent to use a
TLS certificate signed by a trusted certificate au-
thority. TLS certificates are, typically, issued for a
domain instead of an IP address.
TLS certificate and its private key will need to
be distributed along with web agent. Hence, they
should be considered public. And, on the same
note, for security reasons, it is recommended that
the entire domain is considered public and subdo-
mains are not used for any other purpose.
The domain localhost-ssh-webagent.in has
been assigned for this purpose and it resolves to the
suggested IPv4 address, 127.82.11.29. The whois
information for localhost-ssh-webagent.in provides
the current contact to obtain TLS certificates.
C Connection Owner
A web agent listening on loopback interface can be
connected to by any user. This results in a privilege
escalation and unauthorized access to private key.
This security issue can be mitigated by ensuring
that the remote end of the local connection belongs
to the owner of the web agent process itself. The
premise here is that the owner of the web agent
process is given access to the private key and hence
can allow access to the same user.
On linux kernels, /proc/net/tcp provides a for-
matted output of active connections. In this out-
put, the columns local_address, rem_address and
uid are of relevance to us. The IPv4 address and
port in the output are shown in hexadecimal.
The sample output below shows the web agent
listening on 127.82.11.29:8211 (1), a SSH server lis-
tening on 0.0.0.0:22 (2) and a SMTP server listen-
ing on 127.0.0.1:25 (3). It should be noted that the
uid for web agent is 1000, indicating a user, while
the uid for others is, 0 indicating the superuser.
local_address rem_address uid
1 1D0B527F:2013 00000000:0000 1000
2 00000000:0016 00000000:0000 0
3 0100007F:0019 00000000:0000 0
The sample output below shows active local
connections,
local_address rem_address uid
1D0B527F:2013 00000000:0000 1000 listener
1D0B527F:2013 0100007F:CE93 1000 accept
1D0B527F:2013 0100007F:CE94 0 reject
0100007F:CE93 1D0B527F:2013 1000 -
0100007F:CE94 1D0B527F:2013 0 -
Using the output above, web agent can easily
compare the uid of connection with the process uid.
In case of a mismatch, the connection has origi-
nated from a different user and should be rejected.
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